7 papers
Settling the Complexity Landscape of Multi-Agent Contracts with Binary Actions
Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger, Shay Shani
We study the computational complexity of optimal contract design in the multi-agent binary-action model, focusing on gross-substitutes reward functions and related classes. While a…
Combinatorial Contracts Through Demand Types
Elizabeth Baldwin, Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman +1
In the combinatorial action model of contract design, a principal delegates a complex project to an agent, incentivizing a subset of actions from a ground set of actions, via a…
Equal-Pay Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
We study multi-agent contract design, where a principal incentivizes a team of agents to take costly actions that jointly determine the project success via a combinatorial reward f…
One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
We study multi-agent contract design with combinatorial actions, under budget constraints, and for a broad class of objective functions, including profit (principal's utility), rew…
Budget-Feasible Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
The problem of computing near-optimal contracts in combinatorial settings has recently attracted significant interest in the computer science community. Previous work has provided…
Contract Design for Sequential Actions
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
We introduce a novel model of contracts with combinatorial actions that accounts for sequential and adaptive agent behavior. As in the standard model, a principal delegates the exe…
On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Maya Schlesinger
We study two combinatorial contract design models -- multi-agent and multi-action -- where a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to others. In both settings, the…