Frederick Qiu

most citedSettling the Communication Complexity of VCG-based Mechanisms for all Approximation Guarantees

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cs.GT2025

The Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Additional Succinct Bidders

Frederick V. Qiu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang

We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with bidders from either a standard valuation class (which require exponential communication…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

Settling the Communication Complexity of VCG-based Mechanisms for all Approximation Guarantees

Frederick V. Qiu, S. Matthew Weinberg

We consider truthful combinatorial auctions with items $M = [m]$ for sale to $n$ bidders, where each bidder $i$ has a private monotone valuation $v_{i} : 2^{M} \to R_{+}$ . Among truthful…