10 papers
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Frank Yang, Piotr Dworczak
Multidimensional screening is (in)famously intractable. In this paper, we study optimal screening mechanisms subject to a tractability constraint from the agent's perspective. Spec…
Stochastic Optimization and Coupling
Frank Yang, Kai Hao Yang
We study optimization problems in which a linear functional is maximized over probability measures that are dominated by a given measure according to an integral stochastic order i…
Screening Frontiers
Frank Yang
A principal screens an agent with an arbitrary set of allocations . The agent's values for the allocations are comonotonic. A subset of allocations is a surplu…
Dynamic stimulated emission for deterministic addition and subtraction of propagating photons
Haoyuan Luo, Parth S. Shah, Frank Yang +2
Photon subtraction and addition are essential non-Gaussian processes in quantum optics, where conventional methods using linear optics and number-resolving detection often suffer f…
Dynamic Threats to Credible Auctions
Martino Banchio, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Frank Yang
A seller wants to sell a good to a set of bidders using a credible mechanism. We show that when the seller has private information about her cost, it is impossible for a static mec…
Bundling against Learning
Agathe Pernoud, Frank Yang
A monopolist sells multiple goods to an uninformed buyer. The buyer chooses to learn any one-dimensional linear signal of his values for the goods, anticipating the seller's mechan…
Multidimensional Monotonicity and Economic Applications
Frank Yang, Kai Hao Yang
We characterize the extreme points of multidimensional monotone functions from to , as well as the extreme points of the set of one-dimensional marginals of these…
The Simple Economics of Optimal Bundling
Frank Yang
We study optimal bundling when consumers differ in one dimension. We introduce a partial order on the set of bundles defined by (i) set inclusion and (ii) sales volumes (if sold al…
Costly Multidimensional Screening
Frank Yang
A screening instrument is costly if it is socially wasteful and productive otherwise. A principal screens an agent with multidimensional private information and quasilinear prefere…
Dynamic Pricing with Limited Commitment
Martino Banchio, Frank Yang
A monopolist wants to sell one item per period to a consumer with evolving and persistent private information. The seller sets a price each period depending on the history so far,…