activity
20242026
collaborators

15 papers

cs.AI2026

Simulated Control Evals

Jeffrey Olmo, David Zhang, Tyler Tracy

Control evaluations measure whether safeguards can prevent an AI model from causing undesired outcomes even when it is intentionally trying to do so. These evaluations typically us…

cs.CR2026

Screwtape: Adversarial Transcript Editing for Monitor Red-Teaming

Gosha Kozhevnikov, Tyler Tracy

We present Screwtape, a pipeline that converts real agent transcripts into attacks that evade action-only monitors. An LLM attacker edits a transcript so that the agent causes a sp…

cs.AI2026

Code Monitor Red Teaming for Public-Test-Passing Code

Junchi Liao, Jiawen Deng, Fuji Ren

Visible tests are a common gate for LLM-generated code, but passing them does not certify specification correctness. We study a deployment-like monitoring problem: after code has p…

cs.AI2026

Attack Selection in Agentic AI Control Evaluations Meaningfully Decreases Safety

Catherine Ge-Wang, Tyler Crosse, Benjamin Hadad +3

An attacker that strategically chooses when to attack is much harder to catch than one that attacks indiscriminately. AI control is a safety framework for deploying capable but unt…

cs.CR2026

SLEIGHT-Bench: A Benchmark of Evasion Attacks Against Agent Monitors

Elle Najt, Colin Toft, Tyler Tracy +2

Since autonomous coding agents generate complex behaviors at high-volume, we may want to use other LLMs to monitor actions to reduce the risk from dangerous misaligned behavior. To…

cs.CR2026

MonitoringBench: Semi-Automated Red-Teaming for Agent Monitoring

Monika Jotautaitė, Maria Angelica Martinez, Ollie Matthews +1

We introduce a red-teaming methodology that exposes harder-to-catch attacks for coding-agent monitors, suggesting that current practices may under-elicit attacks and overstate moni…

cs.CR2026

LinuxArena: A Control Setting for AI Agents in Live Production Software Environments

Tyler Tracy, Ram Potham, Nick Kuhn +31

We introduce LinuxArena, a control setting in which agents operate directly on live, multi-service production environments. LinuxArena contains 20 environments, 1,671 main tasks re…

cs.CR2026

Attack Selection Reduces Safety in Concentrated AI Control Settings against Trusted Monitoring

Joachim Schaeffer, Arjun Khandelwal, Tyler Tracy

Future AI deployments will likely be monitored for malicious behaviour. The ability of these AIs to subvert monitors by adversarially selecting against them - attack selection - is…

cs.CR2025

BashArena: A Control Setting for Highly Privileged AI Agents

Adam Kaufman, James Lucassen, Tyler Tracy +2

Future AI agents might run autonomously with elevated privileges. If these agents are misaligned, they might abuse these privileges to cause serious damage. The field of AI control…

cs.AI2025

Evaluating Control Protocols for Untrusted AI Agents

Jon Kutasov, Chloe Loughridge, Yuqi Sun +4

As AI systems become more capable and widely deployed as agents, ensuring their safe operation becomes critical. AI control offers one approach to mitigating the risk from untruste…

cs.AI2025

Optimizing AI Agent Attacks With Synthetic Data

Chloe Loughridge, Paul Colognese, Avery Griffin +3

As AI deployments become more complex and high-stakes, it becomes increasingly important to be able to estimate their risk. AI control is one framework for doing so. However, good…

cs.AI2025

SHADE-Arena: Evaluating Sabotage and Monitoring in LLM Agents

Jonathan Kutasov, Yuqi Sun, Paul Colognese +9

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in complex and long horizon settings, it is critical to evaluate their ability to sabotage users by p…

cs.CY2025

Combining Cost-Constrained Runtime Monitors for AI Safety

Tim Tian Hua, James Baskerville, Henri Lemoine +3

Monitoring AIs at runtime can help us detect and stop harmful actions. In this paper, we study how to efficiently combine multiple runtime monitors into a single monitoring protoco…

cs.LG2025

Ctrl-Z: Controlling AI Agents via Resampling

Aryan Bhatt, Cody Rushing, Adam Kaufman +5

Control evaluations measure whether monitoring and security protocols for AI systems prevent intentionally subversive AI models from causing harm. Our work presents the first contr…

cs.ET2024

Self-Assembly of Patterns in the abstract Tile Assembly Model

Phillip Drake, Matthew J. Patitz, Scott M. Summers +1

In the abstract Tile Assembly Model, self-assembling systems consisting of tiles of different colors can form structures on which colored patterns are ``painted.'' We explore the c…