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cs.GT2026
Algorithmic Information Design for Searchers with Uncertain Alternatives
Zhicheng Du, Hu Fu, Ying Qin +1
Advertisements reveal information to consumers who decide on further information acquisition and eventual purchase. Anderson and Renault (2006) first modeled this problem using an…
cs.GT2026
Second-Best Bilateral Trade is Efficient
Zhengyang Liu, Ying Qin, Zeyu Ren +1
The landmark Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes a fundamental impossibility in bilateral trade: no Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism can simultaneously achieve ex-post…
cs.GT2026
Mechanism Design via Market Clearing-Prices for Value Maximizers under Budget and RoS Constraints
Xiaodong Liu, Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang
The transition to auto-bidding in online advertising has shifted the focus of auction theory from quasi-linear utility maximization to value maximization subject to financial const…