4 papers
Ex-Ante Truthful Distribution-Reporting Mechanisms
Xiaotie Deng, Yanru Guan, Ningyuan Li +2
This paper studies mechanism design for revenue maximization in a distribution-reporting setting, where the auctioneer does not know the buyers' true value distributions. Instead,…
Facility Location Problems with Capacity Constraints: Two Facilities and Beyond
Gennaro Auricchio, Zihe Wang, Jie Zhang
In this paper, we investigate the Mechanism Design aspects of the -Capacitated Facility Location Problem (-CFLP) on a line. We focus on two frameworks. In the first framework…
On Truthful Item-Acquiring Mechanisms for Reward Maximization
Liang Shan, Shuo Zhang, Jie Zhang +1
In this research, we study the problem that a collector acquires items from the owner based on the item qualities the owner declares and an independent appraiser's assessments. The…
Cost Minimization for Equilibrium Transition
Haoqiang Huang, Zihe Wang, Zhide Wei +1
In this paper, we delve into the problem of using monetary incentives to encourage players to shift from an initial Nash equilibrium to a more favorable one within a game. Our main…