6 papers · 1 filter
Algorithmic Information Design for Searchers with Uncertain Alternatives
Zhicheng Du, Hu Fu, Ying Qin +1
Advertisements reveal information to consumers who decide on further information acquisition and eventual purchase. Anderson and Renault (2006) first modeled this problem using an…
Second-Best Bilateral Trade is Efficient
Zhengyang Liu, Ying Qin, Zeyu Ren +1
The landmark Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes a fundamental impossibility in bilateral trade: no Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism can simultaneously achieve ex-post…
Mechanism Design via Market Clearing-Prices for Value Maximizers under Budget and RoS Constraints
Xiaodong Liu, Weiran Shen, Zihe Wang
The transition to auto-bidding in online advertising has shifted the focus of auction theory from quasi-linear utility maximization to value maximization subject to financial const…
Deterministic implementation in single-item auctions
Yan Liu, Zeyu Ren, Pingzhong Tang +3
Deterministic auctions are attractive in practice due to their transparency, simplicity, and ease of implementation, motivating a sharper understanding of when they can attain the…
Stackelberg vs. Nash in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game
Yan Liu, Bonan Ni, Weiran Shen +2
Resource competition problems are often modeled using Colonel Blotto games, where players take simultaneous actions. However, many real-world scenarios involve sequential decision-…
Multiplayer General Lotto game
Yan Liu, Bonan Ni, Weiran Shen +2
In this paper, we investigate the multiplayer General Lotto game across multiple battlefields, a significant variant of the Colonel Blotto game. In this version, each player employ…