4 citations · 5 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
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econ.TH2025
Identity-Compatible Auctions
Haoyuan Zeng
This paper studies sellers' and buyers' incentives to engage in shill bidding in single-object auctions. An auction is seller identity-compatible if the seller cannot profit by pos…
econ.TH2025
Persuasive Selection in Signaling Games
Haoyuan Zeng
This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison acr…
econ.TH2025
Mechanism Design with Information Leakage
Samuel Häfner, Marek Pycia, Haoyuan Zeng
We study the design of mechanisms---e.g., auctions---when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof i…