4 citations · 5 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers
GIFT: LLM-Guided State-Reward Interface for Financial Reinforcement Learning
Yanyan Wu, Boyi Zhang, Yanlin Liu +10
Financial portfolio trading is naturally formulated as a reinforcement learning problem, where an agent sequentially rebalances assets under changing market conditions to balance r…
GLM-5: from Vibe Coding to Agentic Engineering
GLM-5-Team, :, Aohan Zeng +184
We present GLM-5, a next-generation foundation model designed to transition the paradigm of vibe coding to agentic engineering. Building upon the agentic, reasoning, and coding (AR…
Conditional Performance Guarantee for Large Reasoning Models
Jianguo Huang, Hao Zeng, Bingyi Jing +2
Large reasoning models have shown strong performance through extended chain-of-thought reasoning, yet their computational cost remains significant. Probably approximately correct (…
SQ-format: A Unified Sparse-Quantized Hardware-friendly Data Format for LLMs
Ruixuan Huang, Hao Zeng, Hantao Huang +4
Post-training quantization (PTQ) plays a crucial role in the democratization of large language models (LLMs). However, existing low-bit quantization and sparsification techniques a…
A note on conditional PAC-efficient reasoning in large language model routing
Hao Zeng, Bingyi Jing
We study distribution-free risk control for model routing, motivated by large language model reasoning. We formalize pointwise conditional efficiency under a probably approximately…
Identity-Compatible Auctions
Haoyuan Zeng
This paper studies sellers' and buyers' incentives to engage in shill bidding in single-object auctions. An auction is seller identity-compatible if the seller cannot profit by pos…
Persuasive Selection in Signaling Games
Haoyuan Zeng
This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison acr…
Mechanism Design with Information Leakage
Samuel Häfner, Marek Pycia, Haoyuan Zeng
We study the design of mechanisms---e.g., auctions---when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof i…
GLM-4.5: Agentic, Reasoning, and Coding (ARC) Foundation Models
5 Team, Aohan Zeng, Xin Lv +167
We present GLM-4.5, an open-source Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) large language model with 355B total parameters and 32B activated parameters, featuring a hybrid reasoning method that s…
Effective Generation of Feasible Solutions for Integer Programming via Guided Diffusion
Hao Zeng, Jiaqi Wang, Avirup Das +4
Feasible solutions are crucial for Integer Programming (IP) since they can substantially speed up the solving process. In many applications, similar IP instances often exhibit simi…