1 citations · 2 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers · 1 filter
Two-sided Market Design Meets Autobidding
Yang Cai, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta +2
Autobidding has become a dominant paradigm in online advertising by enabling advertisers to set high-level goals while algorithms handle real-time bid optimization. A prominent exa…
Efficiency of Generalized Proportional First-Price Auctions Under Auto-bidding
Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +4
Auto-bidding is now widely adopted in online advertising platforms, allowing advertisers to specify high-level campaign objectives--such as maximizing total value subject to a retu…
Improved Revenue Guarantees for Selling Separately and Bundling
Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +4
We study how much revenue a seller can lose by restricting attention to selling separately or grand bundling, in the setting of a single additive buyer with independent item values…
The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided Markets
Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +5
We study Bulow-Klemperer-style competition complexity in two-sided double auctions with unit-demand buyers drawn i.i.d. from and unit-supply sellers drawn i.i.d. from…
From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive Valuations
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +3
Budget-feasible mechanism design is a classic framework introduced by Singer, but there is still a wide gap between existing upper and lower bounds. In this paper, we significantly…
Compensation Design
Ioannis Anagnostides, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Christopher Liaw +5
We introduce compensation design, the problem of designing payment rules that incentivize high-quality contributions in decentralized environments. Here, a budget-constrained princ…
Position Auctions in AI-Generated Content
Santiago Balseiro, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Yuan Deng +7
We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenge…
Equilibria and Learning in Modular Marketplaces
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Jeff Dean, Christopher Liaw +2
We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given b…
Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey
Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Santiago R. Balseiro +23
In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opp…
Deep Reinforcement Learning for Sequential Combinatorial Auctions
Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Di Wang +3
Revenue-optimal auction design is a challenging problem with significant theoretical and practical implications. Sequential auction mechanisms, known for their simplicity and stron…
Auctions with LLM Summaries
Kumar Avinava Dubey, Zhe Feng, Rahul Kidambi +2
We study an auction setting in which bidders bid for placement of their content within a summary generated by a large language model (LLM), e.g., an ad auction in which the display…
Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints
Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Wennan Zhu
We study the efficiency of non-truthful auctions for auto-bidders with both return on spend (ROS) and budget constraints. The efficiency of a mechanism is measured by the price of…