5 papers · 1 filter
Fair Stable Matching: A Nash Social Welfare Approach
Parth Desai, Rasheed M, Ganesh Ghalme +1
While traditional stable matching algorithms, such as the Gale-Shapley algorithm, prioritize stability, they may fall short of achieving equitable outcomes among participants. We s…
Resourced Authority A Mechanism-Design Model for Participatory Governance of Deployed AI Agents
Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Ganesh Ghalme
We give a formal mechanism design model for the continuous participatory governance of a deployed AI agent. The mechanism is built on the principle that governance should control a…
Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information
Andra Siva Sai Teja, Ganesh Ghalme, Sujit Gujar
We study a multi-sender Bayesian persuasion problem with one receiver and several strategic senders. The underlying ground state has multiple components, each privately observed by…
On Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Abstention
Reshef Meir, Ganesh Ghalme
The well-known Condorcet Jury Theorem states that, under majority rule, the better of two alternatives is chosen with probability approaching one as the population grows. We study…
Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Abstention
Ganesh Ghalme, Reshef Meir
The well-known Condorcet's Jury theorem posits that the majority rule selects the best alternative among two available options with probability one, as the population size increase…