8 papers
Fair Stable Matching: A Nash Social Welfare Approach
Parth Desai, Rasheed M, Ganesh Ghalme +1
While traditional stable matching algorithms, such as the Gale-Shapley algorithm, prioritize stability, they may fall short of achieving equitable outcomes among participants. We s…
Resourced Authority A Mechanism-Design Model for Participatory Governance of Deployed AI Agents
Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Ganesh Ghalme
We give a formal mechanism design model for the continuous participatory governance of a deployed AI agent. The mechanism is built on the principle that governance should control a…
Linear Strategic Classification with Endogenous Improvements
Siddharth Shrivastava, Mahvith Akshintala, B Vamsha Vardhan Reddy +3
Strategic classification studies settings in which agents respond to a deployed classifier by modifying observable features at a cost. Classical models typically treat such respons…
Multi-Sender Bayesian Persuasion with Imperfect Information
Andra Siva Sai Teja, Ganesh Ghalme, Sujit Gujar
We study a multi-sender Bayesian persuasion problem with one receiver and several strategic senders. The underlying ground state has multiple components, each privately observed by…
Lipschitz Dueling Bandits over Continuous Action Spaces
Mudit Sharma, Shweta Jain, Vaneet Aggarwal +1
We study for the first time, stochastic dueling bandits over continuous action spaces with Lipschitz structure, where feedback is purely comparative. While dueling bandits and Lips…
On Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Abstention
Reshef Meir, Ganesh Ghalme
The well-known Condorcet Jury Theorem states that, under majority rule, the better of two alternatives is chosen with probability approaching one as the population grows. We study…