2 citations · 3 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2024★ 2 cited
Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Yotam Gafni, Max Resnick
We consider a refinement to the notions of collusion-resistance in transaction fee mechanisms. In particular, we require that the collusion is by itself incentive-compatible and in…
econ.TH2024
Centralization in Attester-Proposer Separation
Mallesh Pai, Max Resnick
We show that Execution Tickets and Execution Auctions dramatically increase centralization in the market for block proposals, even without multi-block MEV concerns. Previous analys…
econ.TH2024
Optimizing Exit Queues for Proof-of-Stake Blockchains: A Mechanism Design Approach
Michael Neuder, Mallesh Pai, Max Resnick
Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocols have provable safety and liveness properties for static validator sets. In practice, however, the validator set changes over time, pote…