2 citations · 3 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Does Your Blockchain Need Multidimensional Transaction Fees?
Nir Lavee, Noam Nisan, Mallesh Pai +1
Blockchains have block-size limits to ensure the entire cluster can keep up with the tip of the chain. These block-size limits are usually single-dimensional, but richer multidimen…
Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Yotam Gafni, Max Resnick
We consider a refinement to the notions of collusion-resistance in transaction fee mechanisms. In particular, we require that the collusion is by itself incentive-compatible and in…
Centralization in Attester-Proposer Separation
Mallesh Pai, Max Resnick
We show that Execution Tickets and Execution Auctions dramatically increase centralization in the market for block proposals, even without multi-block MEV concerns. Previous analys…
Optimizing Exit Queues for Proof-of-Stake Blockchains: A Mechanism Design Approach
Michael Neuder, Mallesh Pai, Max Resnick
Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocols have provable safety and liveness properties for static validator sets. In practice, however, the validator set changes over time, pote…
Structural Advantages for Integrated Builders in MEV-Boost
Mallesh Pai, Max Resnick
Currently, over 90% of Ethereum blocks are built using MEV-Boost, an auction that allows validators to sell their block-building power to builders who compete in an open English au…