5 papers · 1 filter
Computing Equilibrium Nominations in Presidential Elections
Piotr Faliszewski, Stanislaw Kazmierowski, Grzegorz Lisowski +2
We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nom…
Identifying Imperfect Clones in Elections
Piotr Faliszewski, Lukasz Janeczko, Grzegorz Lisowski +2
A perfect clone in an ordinal election (i.e., an election where the voters rank the candidates in a strict linear order) is a set of candidates that each voter ranks consecutively.…
Project Submission Games in Participatory Budgeting
Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk +2
We introduce the framework of project submission games, capturing the behavior of project proposers in participatory budgeting (and multiwinner elections). Here, each proposer subm…
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets
Hadi Hosseini, Grzegorz Lisowski, Shraddha Pathak
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to…
The Cost Perspective of Liquid Democracy: Feasibility and Control
Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Łukasz Janeczko, Grzegorz Lisowski +1
We examine an approval-based model of Liquid Democracy with a budget constraint on voting and delegating costs, aiming to centrally select casting voters ensuring complete represen…