12 papers
Representation in Peer Selection: A Liquid Democracy Perspective
Davide Grossi, Grzegorz Lisowski, Georgios Papasotiropoulos
We study the peer selection problem in which a group of peers must select a fixed-size committee from among themselves. To this end, we introduce a class of approval-based preferen…
Cycles in Liquid Democracy: A Game-Theoretic Justification
Markus Brill, Rachael Colley, Anne-Marie George +3
A common criticism of liquid democracy within the relevant academic literature is that delegation cycles can occur, seemingly resulting in unused voting power. Yet, practitioners a…
The Team Order Problem: Maximizing the Probability of Matching Being Large Enough
Haris Aziz, Jiarui Gan, Grzegorz Lisowski +1
We consider a matching problem, which is meaningful in team competitions, as well as in information theory, recommender systems, and assignment problems. In the competitions which…
Computing Equilibrium Nominations in Presidential Elections
Piotr Faliszewski, Stanislaw Kazmierowski, Grzegorz Lisowski +2
We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nom…
Identifying Imperfect Clones in Elections
Piotr Faliszewski, Lukasz Janeczko, Grzegorz Lisowski +2
A perfect clone in an ordinal election (i.e., an election where the voters rank the candidates in a strict linear order) is a set of candidates that each voter ranks consecutively.…
Project Submission Games in Participatory Budgeting
Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk +2
We introduce the framework of project submission games, capturing the behavior of project proposers in participatory budgeting (and multiwinner elections). Here, each proposer subm…
Two-Sided Manipulation Games in Stable Matching Markets
Hadi Hosseini, Grzegorz Lisowski, Shraddha Pathak
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is an elegant procedure for finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. It ensures that no pair of agents prefers each other to…
The Cost Perspective of Liquid Democracy: Feasibility and Control
Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Łukasz Janeczko, Grzegorz Lisowski +1
We examine an approval-based model of Liquid Democracy with a budget constraint on voting and delegating costs, aiming to centrally select casting voters ensuring complete represen…
Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting
Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk +3
We study strategic behavior of project proposers in the context of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB). In our model we assume that the votes are fixed and known and the pr…
Discovering Consistent Subelections
Łukasz Janeczko, Jérôme Lang, Grzegorz Lisowski +1
We show how hidden interesting subelections can be discovered in ordinal elections. An interesting subelection consists of a reasonably large set of voters and a reasonably large s…
Neighborhood Stability in Assignments on Graphs
Haris Aziz, Grzegorz Lisowski, Mashbat Suzuki +1
We study the problem of assigning agents to the vertices of a graph such that no pair of neighbors can benefit from swapping assignments -- a property we term neighborhood stabilit…
Guide to Numerical Experiments on Elections in Computational Social Choice
Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko +7
We analyze how numerical experiments regarding elections were conducted within the computational social choice literature (focusing on papers published in the IJCAI, AAAI, and AAMA…