collaborators

7 papers

cs.GT2026

Extending Myerson's Optimal Auctions to Correlated Bidders via Neural Network Interpolation

Mingyu Guo, Jiayuan Liu, Vincent Conitzer

We aim to design revenue-maximizing single-item auctions that are deterministic, strategy-proof, and ex post individually rational --- the quintessential fundamental model for opti…

cs.GT2026

Truthful and Expected-Payment-Optimal Model Routing in Graph-Based Agentic Workflows

Jiayuan Liu, Mingyu Guo, Jiarui Gan +1

Assigning routine tasks to cheaper large language model (LLM) providers can reduce generation cost, but switching providers may require processing accumulated context again. Keepin…

cs.GT2026

Beyond Independent Values: Optimal Auctions with Correlated Valuations for LLM-Native Advertising

Shiman Sheng, Mingyu Guo

Conversational assistants are becoming the place where people ask what to buy, and sponsored content is moving into their answers. Several advertisers then compete for one sponsore…

cs.CL2026

The Consensus Trap: Rescuing Multi-Agent LLMs from Adversarial Majorities via Token-Level Collaboration

Jiayuan Liu, Shiyi Du, Weihua Du +2

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) architectures increasingly rely on response-level aggregation, such as Majority Voting (MAJ), to raise reasoning ceilings. However, in open e…

cs.GT2026

Incentive-Aware Multi-Fidelity Optimization for Generative Advertising in Large Language Models

Jiayuan Liu, Barry Wang, Jiarui Gan +4

Generative advertising in large language model (LLM) responses requires optimizing sponsorship configurations under two strict constraints: the strategic behavior of advertisers an…

cs.GT2025

On the Edge of Core (Non-)Emptiness: An Automated Reasoning Approach to Approval-Based Multi-Winner Voting

Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer +3

Core stability is a natural and well-studied notion for group fairness in multi-winner voting, where the task is to select a committee from a pool of candidates. We study the setti…

cs.LG2025

An Interpretable Automated Mechanism Design Framework with Large Language Models

Jiayuan Liu, Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer

Mechanism design has long been a cornerstone of economic theory, with traditional approaches relying on mathematical derivations. Recently, automated approaches, including differen…