6 papers · 1 filter
Delegating Authorization to Misaligned Agents: Coalitional Alignment and Safe Control
Natalie Collina, Surbhi Goel, Aaron Roth +1
Long-running AI agents create a control problem: each action they take changes the state, which in turn affects the trajectory of future actions. If the agent is not fully aligned,…
Personalization Aids Pluralistic Alignment Under Competition
Natalie Collina, Surbhi Goel, Aaron Roth +1
Can competition among misaligned AI providers yield aligned outcomes for a diverse population of users, and what role does model personalization play? We study a setting where mult…
The Value of Ambiguous Commitments in Multi-Follower Games
Natalie Collina, Rabanus Derr, Aaron Roth
We study games in which a leader makes a single commitment, and then multiple followers (each with a different utility function) respond. In particular, we study ambiguous commitme…
Repeated Contracting with Multiple Non-Myopic Agents: Policy Regret and Limited Liability
Natalie Collina, Varun Gupta, Aaron Roth
We study a repeated contracting setting in which a Principal adaptively chooses amongst Agents at each of rounds. The Agents are non-myopic, and so a mechanism for the Prin…
Forecasting for Swap Regret for All Downstream Agents
Aaron Roth, Mirah Shi
We study the problem of making predictions so that downstream agents who best respond to them will be guaranteed diminishing swap regret, no matter what their utility functions are…
Efficient Prior-Free Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents
Natalie Collina, Aaron Roth, Han Shao
We study a repeated Principal Agent problem between a long lived Principal and Agent pair in a prior free setting. In our setting, the sequence of realized states of nature may be…