16 citations · 40 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
A note on the rationing of divisible and indivisible goods in a general network
Shyam Chandramouli, Jay Sethuraman
The study of matching theory has gained importance recently with applications in Kidney Exchange, House Allocation, School Choice etc. The general theme of these problems is to all…
A Note on the Assignment Problem with Uniform Preferences
Jay Sethuraman, Chun Ye
Motivated by a problem of scheduling unit-length jobs with weak preferences over time-slots, the random assignment problem (also called the house allocation problem) is considered…
Strategyproof Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Hybrid and Obnoxious Facility Location
Itai Feigenbaum, Jay Sethuraman
We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem. We would like to locate a facility on a closed interval. There are n agents located on that interval, divided into…
The size of the core in assignment markets
Yash Kanoria, Daniela Saban, Jay Sethuraman
Assignment markets involve matching with transfers, as in labor markets and housing markets. We consider a two-sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure sim…
Approximately Optimal Mechanisms for Strategyproof Facility Location: Minimizing Norm of Costs
Itai Feigenbaum, Jay Sethuraman, Chun Ye
We consider the problem of locating a single facility on the real line. This facility serves a set of agents, each of whom is located on the line, and incurs a cost equal to his di…
Groupstrategyproofness of the Egalitarian Mechanism for Constrained Rationing Problems
Shyam S Chandramouli, Jay Sethuraman
The key contribution of the paper is a comprehensive study of the egalitarian mechanism with respect to manipulation by a coalition of agents. Our main result is that the egalitari…