activity
20082023
most citedStrategyproof Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Hybrid and Obnoxious Facility Location

16 citations · 40 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

12 papers

math.CO2023

Scarf's algorithm and stable marriages

Yuri Faenza, Chengyue He, Jay Sethuraman

Scarf's algorithm gives a pivoting procedure to find a special vertex -- a dominating vertex -- in down-monotone polytopes. This paper studies the behavior of Scarf's algorithm whe…

cs.GT2020★ 2 cited

A note on the rationing of divisible and indivisible goods in a general network

Shyam Chandramouli, Jay Sethuraman

The study of matching theory has gained importance recently with applications in Kidney Exchange, House Allocation, School Choice etc. The general theme of these problems is to all…

cs.DM2019

On optimal ordering in the optimal stopping problem

Shipra Agrawal, Jay Sethuraman, Xingyu Zhang

In the classical optimal stopping problem, a player is given a sequence of random variables with known distributions. After observing the realization of , the…

cs.GT2014

A Note on the Assignment Problem with Uniform Preferences

Jay Sethuraman, Chun Ye

Motivated by a problem of scheduling unit-length jobs with weak preferences over time-slots, the random assignment problem (also called the house allocation problem) is considered…

cs.GT2014★ 16 cited

Strategyproof Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Hybrid and Obnoxious Facility Location

Itai Feigenbaum, Jay Sethuraman

We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem. We would like to locate a facility on a closed interval. There are n agents located on that interval, divided into…

cs.GT2014

The size of the core in assignment markets

Yash Kanoria, Daniela Saban, Jay Sethuraman

Assignment markets involve matching with transfers, as in labor markets and housing markets. We consider a two-sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure sim…