2 citations · 5 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
Approximately Efficient Multidimensional Bilateral Trade
Aviad Rubinstein, Xizhi Tan, Zixin Zhou
A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets. Because achieving the full G…
Welfare Approximation in Multilateral Trade
Tomer Ezra, Aadityan Ganesh, Aviad Rubinstein
We introduce the study of \emph{multilateral trade}: a mechanism-design problem in which a single potential trade involves agents and can be executed only if all agents agr…
Single-Item Auctions with a Monopolist Intermediary
Jingyi Liu, Aviad Rubinstein, Ertem Nusret Tas +2
Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller…
Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Matching Markets
Moshe Babaioff, Aviad Rubinstein, Xizhi Tan +1
A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with strategic agents. As ach…
The complexity of approximate (coarse) correlated equilibrium for incomplete information games
Binghui Peng, Aviad Rubinstein
We study the iteration complexity of decentralized learning of approximate correlated equilibria in incomplete information games. On the negative side, we prove that in $\mathit{ex…
Fast swap regret minimization and applications to approximate correlated equilibria
Binghui Peng, Aviad Rubinstein
We give a simple and computationally efficient algorithm that, for any constant , obtains -swap regret within only rounds; t…