activity
20232026
most citedFast swap regret minimization and applications to approximate correlated equilibria

2 citations · 5 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

19 papers

cs.GT2026

Improved Combinatorial Auctions with and without Samples

Aviad Rubinstein, Sahil Singla

We give new mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in the offline, secretary, and prophet-with-samples models. Specifically, we obtain the following guarantees for social welfare ma…

cs.CC2026

Tarski Fixed Points in Quasi-FPT Queries

Xi Chen, Ruiquan Gao, Yuhao Li +2

We study the query complexity of finding a Tarski fixed point over . Previous work has left a large gap between and . We show tha…

cs.GT2026

Approximately Efficient Multidimensional Bilateral Trade

Aviad Rubinstein, Xizhi Tan, Zixin Zhou

A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets. Because achieving the full G…

cs.GT2026

Welfare Approximation in Multilateral Trade

Tomer Ezra, Aadityan Ganesh, Aviad Rubinstein

We introduce the study of \emph{multilateral trade}: a mechanism-design problem in which a single potential trade involves agents and can be executed only if all agents agr…

cs.GT2026

Single-Item Auctions with a Monopolist Intermediary

Jingyi Liu, Aviad Rubinstein, Ertem Nusret Tas +2

Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller…

cs.DS2026

Secretary, Prophet, and Stochastic Probing via Big-Decisions-First

Aviad Rubinstein, Sahil Singla

We revisit three fundamental problems in algorithms under uncertainty: the Secretary Problem, Prophet Inequality, and Stochastic Probing, each subject to general downward-closed co…

cs.GT2026

Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Matching Markets

Moshe Babaioff, Aviad Rubinstein, Xizhi Tan +1

A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with strategic agents. As ach…

cs.DS2026

Approximation Schemes for Edit Distance and LCS in Quasi-Strongly Subquadratic Time

Xiao Mao, Aviad Rubinstein

We present novel randomized approximation schemes for the Edit Distance (ED) problem and the Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) problem that, for any constant , compute a $(1+ε)…

cs.DS2025

Tight Pair Query Lower Bounds for Matching and Earth Mover's Distance

Amir Azarmehr, Soheil Behnezhad, Mohammad Roghani +1

How many adjacency matrix queries (also known as pair queries) are required to estimate the size of a maximum matching in an -vertex graph ? We study this fundamental questio…

cs.CC2024

Hardness of Approximate Sperner and Applications to Envy-Free Cake Cutting

Ruiquan Gao, Mohammad Roghani, Aviad Rubinstein +1

Given a so called ''Sperner coloring'' of a triangulation of the -dimensional simplex, Sperner's lemma guarantees the existence of a rainbow simplex, i.e. a simplex colored by a…

cs.DS2024

Parallel Sampling via Counting

Nima Anari, Ruiquan Gao, Aviad Rubinstein

We show how to use parallelization to speed up sampling from an arbitrary distribution on a product space , given oracle access to counting queries: $\mathbb{P}_{X\sim μ…

cs.DS2024

Approximating Maximum Matching Requires Almost Quadratic Time

Soheil Behnezhad, Mohammad Roghani, Aviad Rubinstein

We study algorithms for estimating the size of maximum matching. This problem has been subject to extensive research. For -vertex graphs, Bhattacharya, Kiss, and Saranurak [FOCS…

cs.GT2024

The complexity of approximate (coarse) correlated equilibrium for incomplete information games

Binghui Peng, Aviad Rubinstein

We study the iteration complexity of decentralized learning of approximate correlated equilibria in incomplete information games. On the negative side, we prove that in $\mathit{ex…

cs.DS2023★ 1 cited

Local Computation Algorithms for Maximum Matching: New Lower Bounds

Soheil Behnezhad, Mohammad Roghani, Aviad Rubinstein

We study local computation algorithms (LCA) for maximum matching. An LCA does not return its output entirely, but reveals parts of it upon query. For matchings, each query is a ver…

cs.GT2023★ 2 cited

Fast swap regret minimization and applications to approximate correlated equilibria

Binghui Peng, Aviad Rubinstein

We give a simple and computationally efficient algorithm that, for any constant , obtains -swap regret within only rounds; t…

cs.DS2023

Approximate Earth Mover's Distance in Truly-Subquadratic Time

Lorenzo Beretta, Aviad Rubinstein

We design an additive approximation scheme for estimating the cost of the min-weight bipartite matching problem: given a bipartite graph with non-negative edge costs and $\varepsil…

cs.GT2023

Quantum Communication Complexity of Classical Auctions

Aviad Rubinstein, Zixin Zhou

We study the fundamental, classical mechanism design problem of single-buyer multi-item Bayesian revenue-maximizing auctions under the lens of communication complexity between the…

cs.GT2023

Envy-Free Cake-Cutting for Four Agents

Alexandros Hollender, Aviad Rubinstein

In the envy-free cake-cutting problem we are given a resource, usually called a cake and represented as the interval, and a set of agents with heterogeneous preferences…

cs.GT2023★ 2 cited

A constant factor approximation for Nash social welfare with subadditive valuations

Shahar Dobzinski, Wenzheng Li, Aviad Rubinstein +1

We present a constant-factor approximation algorithm for the Nash social welfare maximization problem with subadditive valuations accessible via demand queries. More generally, we…