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cs.GT2024
Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding
Gagan Aggarwal, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas +1
We consider the problem of a designer who wants to allocate resources to representatives, that then distribute the resources they receive among the individuals they represent. Moti…
cs.GT2024
Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Marios Mertzanidis, Divyarthi Mohan +1
We study revenue maximization for agents with additive preferences, subject to downward-closed constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In seminal work, Alaei~\cite{alaei201…
cs.GT2024
Automating Food Drop: The Power of Two Choices for Dynamic and Fair Food Allocation
Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma
Food waste and food insecurity are two closely related pressing global issues. Food rescue organizations worldwide run programs aimed at addressing the two problems. In this paper,…