9 papers
Is Solving Better Than Evaluating GenAI Solutions?
Ethan Dickey, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas
As Generative AI (GenAI) tools become increasingly capable of generating solutions to computing assignments, the computing education community is exploring pedagogical approaches t…
Facility Location for Congesting Commuters and Generalizing the Cost-Distance Problem
Thanasis Lianeas, Marios Mertzanidis, Aikaterini Nikolidaki
In Facility Location problems there are agents that should be connected to facilities and locations where facilities may be opened so that agents can connect to them. We depart fro…
On the Existence of Fair Allocations for Goods and Chores under Dissimilar Preferences
Egor Gagushin, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas
We study the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a multiset of types of indivisible items among groups of agents, where all agents within a group have id…
Hallucinating Flows for Optimal Mechanisms
Marios Mertzanidis, Athina Terzoglou
Myerson's seminal characterization of the revenue-optimal auction for a single item \cite{myerson1981optimal} remains a cornerstone of mechanism design. However, generalizing this…
Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding
Gagan Aggarwal, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas +1
We consider the problem of a designer who wants to allocate resources to representatives, that then distribute the resources they receive among the individuals they represent. Moti…
Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Marios Mertzanidis, Divyarthi Mohan +1
We study revenue maximization for agents with additive preferences, subject to downward-closed constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In seminal work, Alaei~\cite{alaei201…
Automating Food Drop: The Power of Two Choices for Dynamic and Fair Food Allocation
Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma
Food waste and food insecurity are two closely related pressing global issues. Food rescue organizations worldwide run programs aimed at addressing the two problems. In this paper,…
Refined Mechanism Design for Approximately Structured Priors via Active Regression
Christos Boutsikas, Petros Drineas, Marios Mertzanidis +2
We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with a large number of items for sale to strategic bidders, whose valuations are drawn independently from high-dimens…
On the Robustness of Mechanism Design under Total Variation Distance
Anuran Makur, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas +1
We study the problem of designing mechanisms when agents' valuation functions are drawn from unknown and correlated prior distributions. In particular, we are given a prior distrib…