2 citations · 4 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
New Combinatorial Insights for Monotone Apportionment
Javier Cembrano, José Correa, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin +2
The apportionment problem constitutes a fundamental problem in democratic societies: How to distribute a fixed number of seats among a set of states in proportion to the states' po…
Packing a Knapsack with Items Owned by Strategic Agents
Javier Cembrano, Max Klimm, Martin Knaack
This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knap…
Proportionality in Multiple Dimensions to Design Electoral Systems
Javier Cembrano, José Correa, Gonzalo Díaz +1
How to elect the representatives in legislative bodies is a question that every modern democracy has to answer. This design task has to consider various elements so as to fulfill t…
Impartial Selection Under Combinatorial Constraints
Javier Cembrano, Max Klimm, Arturo Merino
Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of th…