2 citations · 4 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers
Faster Symmetric Rendezvous on Four or More Locations
Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, Max Klimm
In the symmetric rendezvous problem, two players follow the same (randomized) strategy to visit one of locations in each time step . Their goal is to minimize th…
Social Welfare in Budget Aggregation
Javier Cembrano, Rupert Freeman, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin +1
We study budget aggregation under -utilities, a model in which agents with heterogeneous preferences allocate a public budget across alternatives. Each agent reports their…
Impartial Selection with Predictions
Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, Max Klimm
We study the selection of agents based on mutual nominations, a theoretical problem with many applications from committee selection to AI alignment. As agents both select and are s…
Online Proportional Apportionment
Javier Cembrano, Jose Correa, Svenja M. Griesbach +1
Traditionally, the problem of apportioning the seats of a legislative body has been viewed as a one-shot process with no dynamic considerations. While this approach is reasonable f…
Near-feasible Fair Allocations in Two-sided Markets
Javier Cembrano, Andrés Moraga, Victor Verdugo
We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex a…
Metric Distortion in Peer Selection
Javier Cembrano, Golnoosh Shahkarami
In the metric distortion problem, a set of voters and candidates lie in a common metric space, and a committee of candidates must be elected. The objective is to minimize a soc…
New Combinatorial Insights for Monotone Apportionment
Javier Cembrano, José Correa, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin +2
The apportionment problem constitutes a fundamental problem in democratic societies: How to distribute a fixed number of seats among a set of states in proportion to the states' po…
Packing a Knapsack with Items Owned by Strategic Agents
Javier Cembrano, Max Klimm, Martin Knaack
This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knap…
Proportionality in Multiple Dimensions to Design Electoral Systems
Javier Cembrano, José Correa, Gonzalo Díaz +1
How to elect the representatives in legislative bodies is a question that every modern democracy has to answer. This design task has to consider various elements so as to fulfill t…
Impartial Selection Under Combinatorial Constraints
Javier Cembrano, Max Klimm, Arturo Merino
Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of th…
Impartial Rank Aggregation
Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, Max Klimm
We study functions that produce a ranking of individuals from such rankings and are impartial in the sense that the position of an individual in the output ranking does not…
Deterministic Impartial Selection with Weights
Javier Cembrano, Svenja M. Griesbach, Maximilian J. Stahlberg
In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size among a group of is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechani…
Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection
Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, Max Klimm
We give new bounds for the single-nomination model of impartial selection, a problem proposed by Holzman and Moulin (Econometrica, 2013). A selection mechanism, which may be random…
Optimal Impartial Correspondences
Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, Max Klimm
We study mechanisms that select a subset of the vertex set of a directed graph in order to maximize the minimum indegree of any selected vertex, subject to an impartiality constrai…
Impartial Selection with Additive Guarantees via Iterated Deletion
Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, David Hannon +1
Impartial selection is the selection of an individual from a group based on nominations by other members of the group, in such a way that individuals cannot influence their own cha…