9 citations · 23 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers · 1 filter
Online Advertising with Spatial Interactions
Gagan Aggarwal, Yifan Wang, Mingfei Zhao
Online advertising platforms must decide how to allocate multiple ads across limited screen real estate, where each ad's effectiveness depends not only on its own placement but als…
Multi-Platform Autobidding with and without Predictions
Gagan Aggarwal, Anupam Gupta, Xizhi Tan +1
We study the problem of finding the optimal bidding strategy for an advertiser in a multi-platform auction setting. The competition on a platform is captured by a value and a cost…
Randomized Truthful Auctions with Learning Agents
Gagan Aggarwal, Anupam Gupta, Andres Perlroth +1
We study a setting where agents use no-regret learning algorithms to participate in repeated auctions. \citet{kolumbus2022auctions} showed, rather surprisingly, that when bidders p…
Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding
Gagan Aggarwal, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas +1
We consider the problem of a designer who wants to allocate resources to representatives, that then distribute the resources they receive among the individuals they represent. Moti…
Selling Joint Ads: A Regret Minimization Perspective
Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Paul Dütting +1
Motivated by online retail, we consider the problem of selling one item (e.g., an ad slot) to two non-excludable buyers (say, a merchant and a brand). This problem captures, for ex…
Auto-bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey
Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Santiago R. Balseiro +23
In this survey, we summarize recent developments in research fueled by the growing adoption of automated bidding strategies in online advertising. We explore the challenges and opp…
Platform Competition in the Autobidding World
Gagan Aggarwal, Andres Perlroth, Ariel Schvartzman +1
We study the problem of auction design for advertising platforms that face strategic advertisers who are bidding across platforms. Each advertiser's goal is to maximize their total…
No-Regret Algorithms in non-Truthful Auctions with Budget and ROI Constraints
Gagan Aggarwal, Giannis Fikioris, Mingfei Zhao
Advertisers increasingly use automated bidding to optimize their ad campaigns on online advertising platforms. Autobidding optimizes an advertiser's objective subject to various co…
Multi-Channel Auction Design in the Autobidding World
Gagan Aggarwal, Andres Perlroth, Junyao Zhao
Over the past few years, more and more Internet advertisers have started using automated bidding for optimizing their advertising campaigns. Such advertisers have an optimization g…
Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions
Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta +2
Internet ad auctions have evolved from a few lines of text to richer informational layouts that include images, sitelinks, videos, etc. Ads in these new formats occupy varying amou…
Maximizing revenue in the presence of intermediaries
Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Guru Guruganesh +1
We study the mechanism design problem of selling items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is re…
Efficiency of (Revenue-)Optimal Mechanisms
Gagan Aggarwal, Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta
We compare the expected efficiency of revenue maximizing (or {\em optimal}) mechanisms with that of efficiency maximizing ones. We show that the efficiency of the revenue maximizin…
General Auction Mechanism for Search Advertising
Gagan Aggarwal, S. Muthukrishnan, David Pal +1
In sponsored search, a number of advertising slots is available on a search results page, and have to be allocated among a set of advertisers competing to display an ad on the page…
Sponsored Search Auctions with Markovian Users
Gagan Aggarwal, Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan +1
Sponsored search involves running an auction among advertisers who bid in order to have their ad shown next to search results for specific keywords. Currently, the most popular auc…
Bidding to the Top: VCG and Equilibria of Position-Based Auctions
Gagan Aggarwal, S. Muthukrishnan, Jon Feldman
Many popular search engines run an auction to determine the placement of advertisements next to search results. Current auctions at Google and Yahoo! let advertisers specify a sing…