activity
20222026
most citedPULSAR: Simultaneous Many-Row Activation for Reliable and High-Performance Computing in Off-the-Shelf DRAM Chips

3 citations · 9 across the 20 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing cs.CRShow all

7 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2026

MORDOR: Mitigating Overheads of Read Disturbance Preventive Operations via Elastic Refresh Scheduling

Maria Makeenkova, Ataberk Olgun, F. Nisa Bostancı +3

Modern DRAM chips are susceptible to read disturbance phenomena such as RowHammer, where repeatedly accessing (hammering) a row of DRAM cells (i.e., a DRAM row) induces bitflips in…

cs.CR2026

ColumnKeeper: Efficient Solutions to the ColumnDisturb Vulnerability in DRAM-based Systems

Andreas Kosmas Kakolyris, F. Nisa Bostanci, Ataberk Olgun +7

Modern DRAM chips are vulnerable to read disturbance phenomena such as RowHammer and RowPress, which induce bitflips after accessing nearby rows a certain number of times (the read…

cs.CR2026

Memory-Centric Computing: Security Benefits and Challenges of Processing-in-DRAM

Ismail Emir Yuksel, F. Nisa Bostanci, Ataberk Olgun +1

Today's computing systems are processor-centric: they require frequent data movement between processing elements (e.g., CPU) and main memory (DRAM), leading to significant ineffici…

cs.CR2026

ScaleDisturb: Exploiting Temporal Asymmetry to Amplify Read Disturbance in Modern DRAM Chips

Jikun Wang, Haocong Luo, Ataberk Olgun +6

DRAM suffers from read disturbance phenomena (e.g., RowHammer and RowPress), where repeatedly accessing or continuously keeping open a DRAM row (aggressor row) induces bitflips in…

cs.CR2025

Understanding and Mitigating Covert Channel and Side Channel Vulnerabilities Introduced by RowHammer Defenses

F. Nisa Bostancı, Oğuzhan Canpolat, Ataberk Olgun +5

DRAM chips are vulnerable to read disturbance phenomena (e.g., RowHammer and RowPress), where repeatedly accessing or keeping open a DRAM row causes bitflips in nearby rows. Attack…

cs.CR2024★ 1 cited

Revisiting Main Memory-Based Covert and Side Channel Attacks in the Context of Processing-in-Memory

F. Nisa Bostanci, Konstantinos Kanellopoulos, Ataberk Olgun +6

We introduce IMPACT, a set of high-throughput main memory-based timing attacks that leverage characteristics of processing-in-memory (PiM) architectures to establish covert and sid…

cs.CR2024

CoMeT: Count-Min-Sketch-based Row Tracking to Mitigate RowHammer at Low Cost

F. Nisa Bostanci, Ismail Emir Yuksel, Ataberk Olgun +5

We propose a new RowHammer mitigation mechanism, CoMeT, that prevents RowHammer bitflips with low area, performance, and energy costs in DRAM-based systems at very low RowHammer th…