111 citations · 243 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Monotonic Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods
Ran Ben-Moshe, Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan
Maximizing the revenue from selling two or more goods has been shown to require the use of mechanisms, where a higher-valuation buyer may pay less than a lower-valua…
The Better Half of Selling Separately
Sergiu Hart, Philip J. Reny
Separate selling of two independent goods is shown to yield at least 62% of the optimal revenue, and at least 73% when the goods satisfy the Myerson regularity condition. This impr…
The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria
Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan
We consider the complexity of finding a correlated equilibrium of an -player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries on players' payoffs at pure strategy profi…
Selling Multiple Correlated Goods: Revenue Maximization and Menu-Size Complexity (old title: "The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions")
Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan
We consider the well known, and notoriously difficult, problem of a single revenue-maximizing seller selling two or more heterogeneous goods to a single buyer whose private values…
Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items
Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan
Maximizing the revenue from selling _more than one_ good (or item) to a single buyer is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we s…