111 citations · 243 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers
Repeat Voting: Two-Vote May Lead More People To Vote
Sergiu Hart
A "repeat voting" procedure is proposed, whereby voting is carried out in two identical rounds. Every voter can vote in each round, the results of the first round are made public b…
Forecast Hedging and Calibration
Dean P. Foster, Sergiu Hart
Calibration means that forecasts and average realized frequencies are close. We develop the concept of forecast hedging, which consists of choosing the forecasts so as to guarantee…
Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, Finite Recall, and Nash Dynamics
Dean P. Foster, Sergiu Hart
We propose to smooth out the calibration score, which measures how good a forecaster is, by combining nearby forecasts. While regular calibration can be guaranteed only by randomiz…
Monotonic Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods
Ran Ben-Moshe, Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan
Maximizing the revenue from selling two or more goods has been shown to require the use of mechanisms, where a higher-valuation buyer may pay less than a lower-valua…
Posterior Probabilities: Nonmonotonicity, Asymptotic Rates, Log-Concavity, and Turán's Inequality
Sergiu Hart, Yosef Rinott
In the standard Bayesian framework data are assumed to be generated by a distribution parametrized by in a parameter space , over which a prior distribution is given. A…
Posterior Probabilities: Dominance and Optimism
Sergiu Hart, Yosef Rinott
The Bayesian posterior probability of the true state is stochastically dominated by that same posterior under the probability law of the true state. This generalizes to notions of…
Calibrated Forecasts: The Minimax Proof
Sergiu Hart
A formal write-up of the simple proof (1995) of the existence of calibrated forecasts by the minimax theorem, which moreover shows that periods suffice to guarantee a calibra…
"Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game
Dean P. Foster, Sergiu Hart
In order to identify expertise, forecasters should not be tested by their calibration score, which can always be made arbitrarily small, but rather by their Brier score. The Brier…
The Better Half of Selling Separately
Sergiu Hart, Philip J. Reny
Separate selling of two independent goods is shown to yield at least 62% of the optimal revenue, and at least 73% when the goods satisfy the Myerson regularity condition. This impr…
The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria
Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan
We consider the complexity of finding a correlated equilibrium of an -player game in a model that allows the algorithm to make queries on players' payoffs at pure strategy profi…
Selling Multiple Correlated Goods: Revenue Maximization and Menu-Size Complexity (old title: "The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions")
Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan
We consider the well known, and notoriously difficult, problem of a single revenue-maximizing seller selling two or more heterogeneous goods to a single buyer whose private values…
Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items
Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan
Maximizing the revenue from selling _more than one_ good (or item) to a single buyer is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we s…
Evolutionarily stable strategies of random games, and the vertices of random polygons
Sergiu Hart, Yosef Rinott, Benjamin Weiss
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an equilibrium strategy that is immune to invasions by rare alternative (``mutant'') strategies. Unlike Nash equilibria, ESS do not alway…