1 citations · 1 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Agent-Designed Contracts: How to Sell Hidden Actions
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli
We study the problem faced by a service provider that has to sell services to a user. In our model the service provider proposes various payment options (a menu) to the user which…
Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions
Federico Cacciamani, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni +1
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. Unlike previous work, we consider a general setting in which each agent has an arbitrary number of actions, an…
Regret-Minimizing Contracts: Agency Under Uncertainty
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi
We study the fundamental problem of designing contracts in principal-agent problems under uncertainty. Previous works mostly addressed Bayesian settings in which principal's uncert…
Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian Persuasion
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +3
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the on…
Last-iterate Convergence to Trembling-hand Perfect Equilibria
Martino Bernasconi, Alberto Marchesi, Francesco Trovò
Designing efficient algorithms to find Nash equilibrium (NE) refinements in sequential games is of paramount importance in practice. Indeed, it is well known that the NE has severa…