2 citations · 3 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
Incentivizing honest performative predictions with proper scoring rules
Caspar Oesterheld, Johannes Treutlein, Emery Cooper +1
Proper scoring rules incentivize experts to accurately report beliefs, assuming predictions cannot influence outcomes. We relax this assumption and investigate incentives when pred…
The Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games
Emanuel Tewolde, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer +1
We study single-player extensive-form games with imperfect recall, such as the Sleeping Beauty problem or the Absentminded Driver game. For such games, two natural equilibrium conc…
For Learning in Symmetric Teams, Local Optima are Global Nash Equilibria
Scott Emmons, Caspar Oesterheld, Andrew Critch +2
Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that li…