6 citations · 13 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
Showing 2023 · cs.GTShow all
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cs.GT2023
On the optimality of Shapley mechanism for funding public excludable goods under Sybil strategies
Bruno Mazorra
In the realm of cost-sharing mechanisms, the vulnerability to Sybil strategies -- also known as false-name strategies, where agents create fake identities to manipulate outcomes --…
cs.GT2023★ 1 cited
Towards Optimal Prior-Free Permissionless Rebate Mechanisms, with applications to Automated Market Makers & Combinatorial Orderflow Auctions
Bruno Mazorra, Nicolás Della Penna
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a critical issue for blockchain ecosystems, as it enables validators or block proposers to extract value by ordering, including or censor…
cs.GT2023★ 1 cited
The Cost of Sybils, Credible Commitments, and False-Name Proof Mechanisms
Bruno Mazorra, Nicolás Della Penna
Consider a mechanism that cannot observe how many players there are directly, but instead must rely on their self-reports to know how many are participating. Suppose the players ca…