6 citations · 13 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers
Competing Auctions in Intermediated Markets
Bruno Mazorra, Minghao Pan, Christoph Schlegel
We analyze competing auctions in intermediated markets, where a seller selects among parallel mechanisms for the sale of a single good, most prominently the relay-and-protocol arch…
The Price of Decentralization in Block Building
Burak Öz, Fei Wu, Luis Correia +3
Decentralized block building mechanisms replace the monopoly of a single proposer with multiple builders. However, their censorship-resistance and fair-access benefits depend not o…
Timing Games: Probabilistic backrunning and spam
Bruno Mazorra, Christoph Schlegel, Akaki Mamageishvili
There are players who compete by timing their actions. An opportunity appears randomly on a time interval. Whoever takes an action the fastest after the opportunity has arisen…
The Free Option Problem of ePBS
Bruno Mazorra, Burak Öz, Christoph Schlegel +1
Ethereum's upcoming Glamsterdam upgrade introduces EIP-7732 enshrined Proposer--Builder Separation (ePBS), which improves the block production pipeline by addressing trust and scal…
Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance
Burak Öz, Christof Ferreira Torres, Christoph Schlegel +4
Decentralized finance (DeFi) markets spread across Layer-1 (L1) and Layer-2 (L2) blockchains rely on arbitrage to keep prices aligned. Today most price gaps are closed against cent…
On the optimality of Shapley mechanism for funding public excludable goods under Sybil strategies
Bruno Mazorra
In the realm of cost-sharing mechanisms, the vulnerability to Sybil strategies -- also known as false-name strategies, where agents create fake identities to manipulate outcomes --…
Towards Optimal Prior-Free Permissionless Rebate Mechanisms, with applications to Automated Market Makers & Combinatorial Orderflow Auctions
Bruno Mazorra, Nicolás Della Penna
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a critical issue for blockchain ecosystems, as it enables validators or block proposers to extract value by ordering, including or censor…
The Cost of Sybils, Credible Commitments, and False-Name Proof Mechanisms
Bruno Mazorra, Nicolás Della Penna
Consider a mechanism that cannot observe how many players there are directly, but instead must rely on their self-reports to know how many are participating. Suppose the players ca…
Constant Function Market Making, Social Welfare and Maximal Extractable Value
Bruno Mazorra, Nicolás Della Penna
We consider the social welfare that can be facilitated by a constant function market maker (CFMM). When there is sufficient liquidity available to the CFMM, it can approximate the…
An Automated Market Maker Minimizing Loss-Versus-Rebalancing
Conor McMenamin, Vanesa Daza, Bruno Mazorra
The always-available liquidity of automated market makers (AMMs) has been one of the most important catalysts in early cryptocurrency adoption. However, it has become increasingly…
Price of MEV: Towards a Game Theoretical Approach to MEV
Bruno Mazorra, Michael Reynolds, Vanesa Daza
Maximal (also miner) extractable value, or MEV, usually refers to the value that privileged players can extract by strategically ordering, censoring, and placing transactions in a…
Do not rug on me: Zero-dimensional Scam Detection
Bruno Mazorra, Victor Adan, Vanesa Daza
Uniswap, like other DEXs, has gained much attention this year because it is a non-custodial and publicly verifiable exchange that allows users to trade digital assets without trust…