162 citations · 167 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information
Dirk Bergemann, Marek Bojko, Paul Dütting +3
We study mechanism design in environments where agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. In such settings with multi-dimensiona…
A Strategic Topology on Information Structures
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Rafael Veiel
Two information structures are said to be close if, with high probability, there is approximate common knowledge that interim beliefs are close under the two information structures…
Screening and Segmenting: A Consumer Surplus Perspective
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Michael C. Wang
We analyze consumer surplus when a monopolist can adjust both prices and product qualities across segments, engaging in second- and third-degree price discrimination simultaneously…
Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti
We analyze digital markets where a monopolist platform uses data to match multiproduct sellers with heterogeneous consumers who can purchase both on and off the platform. The platf…
How Do Digital Advertising Auctions Impact Product Prices?
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Nicholas Wu
We present a model of digital advertising with three key features: (i) advertisers can reach consumers on and off a platform, (ii) additional data enhances the value of advertiser-…
The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris
We consider a nonlinear pricing environment with private information. We provide profit guarantees (and associated mechanisms) that the seller can achieve across all possible distr…
Screening with Persuasion
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann, Stephen Morris
We analyze a nonlinear pricing model where the seller controls both product pricing (screening) and buyer information about their own values (persuasion). We prove that the optimal…