Showing 2025Show all
3 papers · 1 filter
cs.GT2025
Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents
Aditya Aradhye, David Lagziel, Eilon Solan
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponent…
econ.TH2025
The Structure of Joint Posterior Beliefs
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
We analyze information structures in environments with privately informed agents and a partially informed mediator who provides public signals. Necessary and sufficient conditions,…
econ.TH2025
Public Information Generators: Common Knowledge and Information Loops
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer, Tao Wang
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with privately informed players. One oracle dominates another if, for every experiment of the la…