6 papers
Mechanism Design with Spiteful Agents
Aditya Aradhye, David Lagziel, Eilon Solan
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponent…
The Structure of Joint Posterior Beliefs
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
We analyze information structures in environments with privately informed agents and a partially informed mediator who provides public signals. Necessary and sufficient conditions,…
Public Information Generators: Common Knowledge and Information Loops
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer, Tao Wang
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with privately informed players. One oracle dominates another if, for every experiment of the la…
The Indoctrination Game
Lotem Ikan, David Lagziel
The indoctrination game is a complete-information contest over public opinion. The players exert costly effort to manifest their private opinions in public in order to control the…
Dynamic screening
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
We study dynamic screening problems where elements are subjected to noisy evaluations and, in every stage, some of the elements are rejected while the remaining ones are independen…
On the Failures of Bonus Plans
David Lagziel, Ehud Lehrer
A decision maker (DM) has some funds invested through two investment firms. She wishes to allocate additional funds according to the firms' earnings. The DM, on the one hand, tries…