9 citations · 32 across the 17 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers · 1 filter
Fair Allocation with Optional Selling
Uriel Feige, Yotam Gafni
We consider fair allocation of indivisible goods in a setting in which agents have subjective valuation functions over the set of goods, and in addition, goods may be sold at given…
A Small Collusion is All You Need
Yotam Gafni
Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) study auction design in the Blockchain context, and emphasize robustness against miner and user collusion, moreso than traditional auction theory.…
Envious Explore and Exploit
Omer Ben-Porat, Yotam Gafni, Or Markovetzki
Explore-and-exploit tradeoffs play a key role in recommendation systems (RSs), aiming at serving users better by learning from previous interactions. Despite their commercial succe…
Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Yotam Gafni, Max Resnick
We consider a refinement to the notions of collusion-resistance in transaction fee mechanisms. In particular, we require that the collusion is by itself incentive-compatible and in…
Beyond Proportional Individual Guarantees for Binary Perpetual Voting
Yotam Gafni, Ben Golan
Perpetual voting studies fair collective decision-making in settings where many decisions are to be made, and is a natural framework for settings such as parliaments and the runnin…
Barriers to Collusion-resistant Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Yotam Gafni, Aviv Yaish
To allocate transactions to blocks, cryptocurrencies use an auction-like transaction fee mechanism (TFM). A conjecture of Roughgarden [44] asks whether there is a TFM that is incen…
Scheduling With Time Discounts
Yotam Gafni, Aviv Yaish
We study a \emph{financial} version of the online problem of scheduling weighted packets with deadlines. The main novelty is that, while prior works assume packets have \emph{fixed…
Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Yotam Gafni, Aviv Yaish
Cryptocurrencies employ auction-esque transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate transactions to blocks, and to determine how much fees miners can collect from transactions. Sev…
Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies
Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi +1
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items in a model with goods, chores, and copies, as a unified framework for studying: (1)~the existence of EFX and other solution concept…
Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with Application to False-name Manipulation
Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
Weighted voting games apply to a wide variety of multi-agent settings. They enable the formalization of power indices which quantify the coalitional power of players. We take a nov…
From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail
Xiaotie Deng, Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi +2
We study competition among contests in a general model that allows for an arbitrary and heterogeneous space of contest design, where the goal of the contest designers is to maximiz…
VCG Under False-name Attacks: a Bayesian Analysis
Yotam Gafni, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz
VCG is a classical combinatorial auction that maximizes social welfare. However, while the standard single-item Vickrey auction is false-name-proof, a major failure of multi-item V…