6 citations · 13 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Fair Allocation with Optional Selling
Uriel Feige, Yotam Gafni
We consider fair allocation of indivisible goods in a setting in which agents have subjective valuation functions over the set of goods, and in addition, goods may be sold at given…
A Small Collusion is All You Need
Yotam Gafni
Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) study auction design in the Blockchain context, and emphasize robustness against miner and user collusion, moreso than traditional auction theory.…
Envious Explore and Exploit
Omer Ben-Porat, Yotam Gafni, Or Markovetzki
Explore-and-exploit tradeoffs play a key role in recommendation systems (RSs), aiming at serving users better by learning from previous interactions. Despite their commercial succe…
Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Yotam Gafni, Max Resnick
We consider a refinement to the notions of collusion-resistance in transaction fee mechanisms. In particular, we require that the collusion is by itself incentive-compatible and in…
Beyond Proportional Individual Guarantees for Binary Perpetual Voting
Yotam Gafni, Ben Golan
Perpetual voting studies fair collective decision-making in settings where many decisions are to be made, and is a natural framework for settings such as parliaments and the runnin…
Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks
Yotam Gafni, Moshe Tennenholtz
The quality of learning generally improves with the scale and diversity of data. Companies and institutions can therefore benefit from building models over shared data. Many cloud…