6 papers · 1 filter
Adaptive Contracts for Cost-Effective AI Delegation
Eden Saig, Tamar Garbuz, Ariel D. Procaccia +2
When organizations delegate text generation tasks to AI providers via pay-for-performance contracts, expected payments rise when evaluation is noisy. As evaluation methods become m…
Explainable Information Design
Yiling Chen, Tao Lin, Wei Tang +1
Optimal signaling schemes in information design (Bayesian persuasion) often involve randomization or disconnected partitions of state space, which might be too intricate to be audi…
Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes
Daniel Halpern, Safwan Hossain, Jamie Tucker-Foltz
Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m…
You Can Have Your Cake and Redistrict It Too
Gerdus Benadè, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jamie Tucker-Foltz
The design of algorithms for political redistricting generally takes one of two approaches: optimize an objective such as compactness or, drawing on fair division, construct a prot…
Representation with Incomplete Votes
Daniel Halpern, Gregory Kehne, Ariel D. Procaccia +2
Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with…
Can Buyers Reveal for a Better Deal?
Daniel Halpern, Gregory Kehne, Jamie Tucker-Foltz
We study market interactions in which buyers are allowed to credibly reveal partial information about their types to the seller. Previous recent work has studied the special case o…