activity
20212026
collaborators

9 papers

econ.TH2026

Cheap Talk in Bilateral Trade

Jamie Tucker-Foltz, Richard Zeckhauser

A single seller offers one or more goods to a single buyer. The buyer's values and the seller's costs are private information. Each player has a commonly known prior over the other…

cs.GT2026

Adaptive Contracts for Cost-Effective AI Delegation

Eden Saig, Tamar Garbuz, Ariel D. Procaccia +2

When organizations delegate text generation tasks to AI providers via pay-for-performance contracts, expected payments rise when evaluation is noisy. As evaluation methods become m…

cs.GT2025

Explainable Information Design

Yiling Chen, Tao Lin, Wei Tang +1

Optimal signaling schemes in information design (Bayesian persuasion) often involve randomization or disconnected partitions of state space, which might be too intricate to be audi…

cs.GT2024

Computing Voting Rules with Elicited Incomplete Votes

Daniel Halpern, Safwan Hossain, Jamie Tucker-Foltz

Motivated by the difficulty of specifying complete ordinal preferences over a large set of candidates, we study voting rules that are computable by querying voters about $t < m…

cs.GT2023

You Can Have Your Cake and Redistrict It Too

Gerdus Benadè, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jamie Tucker-Foltz

The design of algorithms for political redistricting generally takes one of two approaches: optimize an objective such as compactness or, drawing on fair division, construct a prot…

cs.GT2022

Representation with Incomplete Votes

Daniel Halpern, Gregory Kehne, Ariel D. Procaccia +2

Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with…

cs.DM2021

Compact Redistricting Plans Have Many Spanning Trees

Ariel D. Procaccia, Jamie Tucker-Foltz

In the design and analysis of political redistricting maps, it is often useful to be able to sample from the space of all partitions of the graph of census blocks into connected su…

cs.GT2021

Can Buyers Reveal for a Better Deal?

Daniel Halpern, Gregory Kehne, Jamie Tucker-Foltz

We study market interactions in which buyers are allowed to credibly reveal partial information about their types to the seller. Previous recent work has studied the special case o…

cs.CC2021

Thou Shalt Covet The Average Of Thy Neighbors' Cakes

Jamie Tucker-Foltz

We prove an lower bound on the query complexity of local proportionality in the Robertson-Webb cake-cutting model. Local proportionality requires that each agent prefer th…