6 citations · 28 across the 20 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers · 1 filter
Markov Persuasion Processes with Endogenous Agent Beliefs
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Haifeng Xu, You Zu
We consider a dynamic Bayesian persuasion setting where a single long-lived sender persuades a stream of ``short-lived'' agents (receivers) by sharing information about a payoff-re…
Rethinking Incentives in Recommender Systems: Are Monotone Rewards Always Beneficial?
Fan Yao, Chuanhao Li, Karthik Abinav Sankararaman +5
The past decade has witnessed the flourishing of a new profession as media content creators, who rely on revenue streams from online content recommendation platforms. The reward me…
Bayesian Calibrated Click-Through Auction
Junjie Chen, Minming Li, Haifeng Xu +1
We study information design in click-through auctions, in which the bidders/advertisers bid for winning an opportunity to show their ads but only pay for realized clicks. The payme…
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria
Jiarui Gan, Minbiao Han, Jibang Wu +1
This paper provides a systematic study of the robust Stackelberg equilibrium (RSE), which naturally generalizes the widely adopted solution concept of the strong Stackelberg equili…
How Bad is Top- Recommendation under Competing Content Creators?
Fan Yao, Chuanhao Li, Denis Nekipelov +2
Content creators compete for exposure on recommendation platforms, and such strategic behavior leads to a dynamic shift over the content distribution. However, how the creators' co…
Inverse Game Theory for Stackelberg Games: the Blessing of Bounded Rationality
Jibang Wu, Weiran Shen, Fei Fang +1
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may…
Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal does not directly observe the agent's effort outcome; rather, she gets a signal about the agent's action ac…
Generalized Principal-Agency: Contracts, Information, Games and Beyond
Jiarui Gan, Minbiao Han, Jibang Wu +1
In the principal-agent problem formulated by Myerson'82, agents have private information (type) and make private decisions (action), both of which are unobservable to the principal…
No-Regret Bayesian Recommendation to Homogeneous Users
Yiding Feng, Wei Tang, Haifeng Xu
We introduce and study the online Bayesian recommendation problem for a recommender system platform. The platform has the privilege to privately observe a utility-relevant \emph{st…
Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidl…
Uncoupled Bandit Learning towards Rationalizability: Benchmarks, Barriers, and Algorithms
Jibang Wu, Haifeng Xu, Fan Yao
Under the uncoupled learning setup, the last-iterate convergence guarantee towards Nash equilibrium is shown to be impossible in many games. This work studies the last-iterate conv…
The Limits of Optimal Pricing in the Dark
Quinlan Dawkins, Minbiao Han, Haifeng Xu
A ubiquitous learning problem in today's digital market is, during repeated interactions between a seller and a buyer, how a seller can gradually learn optimal pricing decisions ba…
Algorithmic Information Design in Multi-Player Games: Possibility and Limits in Singleton Congestion
Chenghan Zhou, Thanh H. Nguyen, Haifeng Xu
Most algorithmic studies on multi-agent information design so far have focused on the restricted situation with no inter-agent externalities; a few exceptions investigated truly st…
Auctioning with Strategically Reticent Bidders
Jibang Wu, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Haifeng Xu
We propose and study a novel mechanism design setup where each bidder holds two kinds of private information: (1) type variable, which can be misreported; (2) information variable,…
Competitive Information Design for Pandora's Box
Bolin Ding, Yiding Feng, Chien-Ju Ho +2
We study a natural competitive-information-design strategic variant for the celebrated Pandora's Box problem (Weitzman, 1979), where each box is associated with a strategic informa…