activity
20202026
most citedPolytope-form games and Index/Degree Theories for Extensive-form games

1 citations · 1 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing econ.THShow all

6 papers · 1 filter

econ.TH2026

Index and Robustness of Mixed Equilibria: An Algebraic Approach

Lucas Pahl

We present two results regarding the relation of the index of equilibria and the index of fixed points, and the index of equilibria and payoff-robustness: any integer can be the in…

econ.TH2024

Robust Equilibria in Generic Extensive form Games

Lucas Pahl, Carlos Pimienta

We prove the 2-player, generic extensive-form case of the conjecture of Govindan and Wilson (1997a,b) and Hauk and Hurkens (2002) stating that an equilibrium component is essential…

econ.TH2022★ 1 cited

Polytope-form games and Index/Degree Theories for Extensive-form games

Lucas Pahl

We present an index theory of equilibria for extensive form games. This requires developing an index theory for games where the strategy sets of players are general polytopes and t…

econ.TH2021

A Finite Characterization of Perfect Equilibria

Ivonne Callejas, Srihari Govindan, Lucas Pahl

Govindan and Klumpp [7] provided a characterization of perfect equilibria using Lexicographic Probability Systems (LPSs). Their characterization was essentially finite in that they…

econ.TH2021

Information Spillover in Multiple Zero-sum Games

Lucas Pahl

This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at…

econ.TH2020

On Sustainable Equilibria

Srihari Govindan, Rida Laraki, Lucas Pahl

Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2000) defined a Nash equilibrium of a finite game as sustainable if it can be made the unique Nash equilibrium of a game o…