1 citations · 1 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Index and Robustness of Mixed Equilibria: An Algebraic Approach
Lucas Pahl
We present two results regarding the relation of the index of equilibria and the index of fixed points, and the index of equilibria and payoff-robustness: any integer can be the in…
Robust Equilibria in Generic Extensive form Games
Lucas Pahl, Carlos Pimienta
We prove the 2-player, generic extensive-form case of the conjecture of Govindan and Wilson (1997a,b) and Hauk and Hurkens (2002) stating that an equilibrium component is essential…
O'Neill's Theorem for Games
Srihari Govindan, Rida Laraki, Lucas Pahl
We present an analog of O'Neill's Theorem (Theorem 5.2 in [17]) for finite games, which reveals some of the structure of equilibria under payoff perturbations in finite games.
Polytope-form games and Index/Degree Theories for Extensive-form games
Lucas Pahl
We present an index theory of equilibria for extensive form games. This requires developing an index theory for games where the strategy sets of players are general polytopes and t…
A Finite Characterization of Perfect Equilibria
Ivonne Callejas, Srihari Govindan, Lucas Pahl
Govindan and Klumpp [7] provided a characterization of perfect equilibria using Lexicographic Probability Systems (LPSs). Their characterization was essentially finite in that they…
Information Spillover in Multiple Zero-sum Games
Lucas Pahl
This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at…
On Sustainable Equilibria
Srihari Govindan, Rida Laraki, Lucas Pahl
Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2000) defined a Nash equilibrium of a finite game as sustainable if it can be made the unique Nash equilibrium of a game o…