10 citations · 32 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
When Are Welfare Guarantees Robust?
Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Jan Vondrák
Computational and economic results suggest that social welfare maximization and combinatorial auction design are much easier when bidders' valuations satisfy the "gross substitutes…
The Price of Anarchy in Auctions
Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic…
Optimal Platform Design
Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden
An auction house cannot generally provide the optimal auction technology to every client. Instead it provides one or several auction technologies, and clients select the most appro…
Making the Most of Your Samples
Zhiyi Huang, Yishay Mansour, Tim Roughgarden
We study the problem of setting a price for a potential buyer with a valuation drawn from an unknown distribution . The seller has "data"' about in the form of i.i…
Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design: Motivation, Examples, and Lessons Learned
Tim Roughgarden
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how…
Combinatorial Auctions with Restricted Complements
Ittai Abraham, Moshe Babaioff, Shaddin Dughmi +1
Complements between goods - where one good takes on added value in the presence of another - have been a thorn in the side of algorithmic mechanism designers. On the one hand, comp…