4 citations · 7 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Quantum Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Quantum Information Structures in Games
Furkan Sezer
Bergemann and Morris (2016) show that one information structure is more informative than another exactly when it induces a smaller set of Bayes correlated equilibrium outcomes in e…
Markov Information Processes
Furkan Sezer
We study information design when a designer with commitment shapes the information of strategically interacting, far-sighted agents whose actions drive a persistent, controlled Mar…
Continuous-Time Information Design for Hurricane Evacuation: Disclosure, Congestion, and Optimal Phasing under Model Uncertainty
Furkan Sezer
We study continuous-time information design for emergency evacuation, where an Emergency Management Agency (the Stackelberg leader) steers strategic evacuation zones via two levers…
Information Design under Uncertain Utilities: Probabilistic and CVaR Approaches
Furkan Sezer
This paper studies information design when the designer lacks precise knowledge of agents' payoff coefficients. The Calibrated Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (Cal-BCE) is introduced…
Continuous-Time Information-Mechanism Control
Furkan Sezer
In a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game, a leader steers strategic followers through the information structure and a transfer mechanism, not the dynamics. We…