4 citations · 7 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Quantum Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Quantum Information Structures in Games
Furkan Sezer
Bergemann and Morris (2016) show that one information structure is more informative than another exactly when it induces a smaller set of Bayes correlated equilibrium outcomes in e…
Markov Information Processes
Furkan Sezer
We study information design when a designer with commitment shapes the information of strategically interacting, far-sighted agents whose actions drive a persistent, controlled Mar…
Continuous-Time Information Design for Hurricane Evacuation: Disclosure, Congestion, and Optimal Phasing under Model Uncertainty
Furkan Sezer
We study continuous-time information design for emergency evacuation, where an Emergency Management Agency (the Stackelberg leader) steers strategic evacuation zones via two levers…
Information Design under Uncertain Utilities: Probabilistic and CVaR Approaches
Furkan Sezer
This paper studies information design when the designer lacks precise knowledge of agents' payoff coefficients. The Calibrated Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (Cal-BCE) is introduced…
Continuous-Time Information-Mechanism Control
Furkan Sezer
In a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game, a leader steers strategic followers through the information structure and a transfer mechanism, not the dynamics. We…
Robust Social Welfare Maximization via Information Design in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games
Furkan Sezer, Ceyhun Eksin
Information design in an incomplete information game includes a designer with the goal of influencing players' actions through signals generated from a designed probability distrib…
Information Preferences of Individual Agents in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Network Games
Furkan Sezer, Ceyhun Eksin
We consider linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) network games in which agents have quadratic payoffs that depend on their individual and neighbors' actions, and an unknown payoff-relev…
Maximizing Social Welfare and Agreement via Information Design in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games
Furkan Sezer, Hossein Khazaei, Ceyhun Eksin
We consider linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games in which players have quadratic payoffs that depend on the players' actions and an unknown payoff-relevant state, and signals on t…
An Iterative Mechanism for Coupling Electricity Markets
Alfredo Garcia, Roohallah Khatami, Ceyhun Eksin +1
The coordinated operation of interconnected but locally controlled electricity markets is generally referred to as a "coupling". In this paper we propose a new mechanism design for…