3 citations · 5 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents
Federico Cacciamani, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the informat…
Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium
Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides +7
A mediator observes no-regret learners playing an extensive-form game repeatedly across rounds. The mediator attempts to steer players toward some desirable predetermined equil…
Computing Optimal Equilibria and Mechanisms via Learning in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games
Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides +7
We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, in…
Online Mechanism Design for Information Acquisition
Federico Cacciamani, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti
We study the problem of designing mechanisms for \emph{information acquisition} scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed \emph{receiver} and a set…