3 citations · 5 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Efficient representations for team and imperfect-recall equilibrium computation
Luca Carminati, Brian Hu Zhang, Federico Cacciamani +4
Equilibrium finding in two-player zero-sum games with perfect recall is a well-studied topic that has led to many breakthroughs in computational game theory. This paper aims to gen…
Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions
Federico Cacciamani, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni +1
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. Unlike previous work, we consider a general setting in which each agent has an arbitrary number of actions, an…
Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents
Federico Cacciamani, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the informat…
Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium
Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides +7
A mediator observes no-regret learners playing an extensive-form game repeatedly across rounds. The mediator attempts to steer players toward some desirable predetermined equil…
Computing Optimal Equilibria and Mechanisms via Learning in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games
Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides +7
We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, in…
Online Mechanism Design for Information Acquisition
Federico Cacciamani, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti
We study the problem of designing mechanisms for \emph{information acquisition} scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed \emph{receiver} and a set…
A Marriage between Adversarial Team Games and 2-player Games: Enabling Abstractions, No-regret Learning, and Subgame Solving
Luca Carminati, Federico Cacciamani, Marco Ciccone +1
\emph{Ex ante} correlation is becoming the mainstream approach for \emph{sequential adversarial team games}, where a team of players faces another team in a zero-sum game. It is kn…
Public Information Representation for Adversarial Team Games
Luca Carminati, Federico Cacciamani, Marco Ciccone +1
The peculiarity of adversarial team games resides in the asymmetric information available to the team members during the play, which makes the equilibrium computation problem hard…
Multi-Agent Coordination in Adversarial Environments through Signal Mediated Strategies
Federico Cacciamani, Andrea Celli, Marco Ciccone +1
Many real-world scenarios involve teams of agents that have to coordinate their actions to reach a shared goal. We focus on the setting in which a team of agents faces an opponent…