14 papers
Contextual Procurement Auctions with Bandit Learning
Yiling Chen, Shi Feng, Sadie Zhao
We study repeated procurement auctions in which producers have private costs and the platform must learn the context-dependent value of selecting each producer. We evaluate perform…
Explainable Information Design
Yiling Chen, Tao Lin, Wei Tang +1
Optimal signaling schemes in information design (Bayesian persuasion) often involve randomization or disconnected partitions of state space, which might be too intricate to be audi…
Evidence Markets
Safwan Hossain, Gabriel Andrade, Chengqi Zang +1
Modern prediction markets face two limitations that restrict their applicability in a range of settings:~(i)~they reveal what the crowd believes but not the evidence or reasoning b…
Modeling Coincident Peak Pricing in Electricity Markets: Challenges and Peak Shaving Effectiveness
Qian Zhang, Sadie Zhao, Lucy Diao +4
Coincident Peak (CP) pricing is widely used in U.S. electricity markets to allocate capacity and transmission costs. This paper develops a behavioral game-theoretic framework for C…
Learning to Persuade a Biased Receiver
Yuqi Pan, Sadie Zhao, Milind Tambe +1
We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted…
Learning a Game by Paying the Agents
Brian Hu Zhang, Tao Lin, Yiling Chen +1
We study the problem of learning the utility functions of no-regret learning agents in a repeated normal-form game. Differing from most prior literature, we introduce a principal w…